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ABSTRACT
The article explores the recent shift in the European Union’s
approach towards candidate states in the Western Balkans.1 It
argues that the European Commission has started to pay greater
attention to parliaments in candidate states in order to promote
and secure accession-related reforms. As a result, national
parliaments in candidate states have greater opportunities to
shape the content of these reforms, including those in the rule of
law sector. Consequently, the article elaborates on the factors that
could potentially affect Balkan parliaments’ involvement in the
accession process.
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Introduction
Although representatives of the European Commission have alluded that no further Euro-
pean Union (EU) enlargement is happening before 2020 (Euractiv 2014b), the EU still
remains committed to accession talks with several Western Balkan candidate states. At
least some of the EU leaders demonstrate a clear commitment to enlargement, as Chan-
cellor Merkel has done at the Western Balkan Conference in August 2014 (Euractiv 2014a;
Balkan Insight 2015); Balkan enlargement is not off the agenda of the EU, yet the time-
frame of this process remains elusive. This situation not only raises questions about the
way EU policy towards the region is formulated, but also about the sustainability of acces-
sion-related reforms in candidate states. This relates especially to judicial reforms (Chap-
ters 23 and 24 of the accession acquis), which are often considered to be the main
challenge of the current accession talks.
The aim of the article is to demonstrate that the approach of the European Commission
(hereafter shortened to “Commission”) to Balkan enlargement has shifted, which has impor-
tant consequences for the ability of candidate states’ parliaments to shape the trajectory of
accession-related reforms. The change in the approach, which occurred in 2013–2014, has
taken place as the Commission realised that: (a) unilateral external pressure on Western
Balkan candidate states to reform political and judicial institutions often results only in
formal compliance with EU norms and rules; and (b) ex-post mechanisms of compliance
control (such as the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM)2) are not an effective
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tool to secure rule of law3 amongst new member states. As support for enlargement
amongst Western Balkan population becomes less pronounced (Balkan Barometer 2015),
involvement of the Commission in “internal political issues” (judicial reform, media
freedom, party funding, etc.) is considered less legitimate, resulting in limited compliance
with EU norms. The EU, however, has to find means of securing compliance, as failing to
do so questions its ability to prepare candidate states for membership. As a result, the Com-
mission puts emphasis on candidate states’ parliaments (something it has not done in pre-
vious enlargement rounds; see Grabbe 2001, 2006), which can act as legitimate “watchdogs”
that increase the “ownership” of the reform process and alert the Commission to violations
of compliance with EU rules. Such a change in the policy of the Commission gives national
parliaments of candidate states a greater degree of leverage in shaping accession-related
reforms.4 This article elaborates on three questions. Firstly, how did the change of Commis-
sion enlargement strategy towards the Western Balkans come about? Secondly, what impli-
cations does this have for Western Balkan parliaments’ ability to shape accession-related
reforms, particular in the rule of law sector?5 Thirdly, which factors could affect Western
Balkan parliaments’ involvement in the accession process?
The article only considers Western Balkan candidate states with which the European Com-
mission has recommended to open negotiations, namely Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro,
and Serbia. This formal status sets them apart from other Western Balkan states (Albania,
Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina)6 as it signifies the willingness of the EU to actually
apply “linkage and leverage” (Way and Levitsky 2007) in order to prepare accession countries
for full membership. Moreover, the case selection reflects variation among these countries in
terms of quality of democratic institutions and compliance with the rule of law principles.
International rankings such as the 2014 Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2015 World
Bank rule of law indicators, and 2015 Nations in Transit show that Macedonia (FYROM), Mon-
tenegro, and Serbia differ in terms of judicial independence and regime type.7 It should be
noted, however, that all of these countries face similar challenges in terms of securing impar-
tial and accountable governance (Börzel 2011; Keil and Arkan 2015a). Given the fact that it is
unclear whether dependent (implementation of rule of law reforms) and independent (e.g.
level of parliamentary involvement) variables will co-vary to the same extent in all the ana-
lysed Balkan candidate states, the article adopts instead a “diverse” case-selection strategy
(Seawright and Gerring 2008). It strives to illuminate a full range of country variation
across key political and judicial parameters in the region.
The evidence presented in this article has been gathered through the analysis of EU
documents, policy papers of several non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as
anonymous interviews with staff members of the Commission, European Parliament, Euro-
pean External Action Service (EEAS), and former diplomats with extensive experience in
the Balkan region.
The shift of the commission’s approach towards Western Balkan candidate
states
The academic debate on the impact of EU policies in the Balkan region is far from over.
While some (Vachudova 2014, 2015) argue that the EU’s involvement has been able to
lock in democratic reforms in the Balkans, others (O’Brennan 2014) have a more sceptical
view. Nevertheless, representatives of both approaches agree that there remains a
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challenge of promoting reforms through an EU-driven external incentive structure. EU
leverage depends on the cost–benefit calculations of candidate states, consistent appli-
cation of conditionality by the EU, and availability of socialisation instruments (Börzel
2011) – yet all of these parameters are now operating in a new context (Balfour and Stra-
tulat 2015). In contrast to previous enlargement rounds, the new context is characterised
by the growing preoccupation of the EU with internal economic problems, decreased
support for accepting new member states, and a greater level of conflict between supra-
national institutions and member states about the trajectory of accession negotiations.
Although the EU remains committed to the “European perspective” for Western Balkan
candidate states, it tries to avoid the use of language that could lead to “rhetorical entrap-
ment” (İçener and Phinnemore 2015). This signifies the onset of “enlargement fatigue”
(Szołucha 2010), a situation when support for accepting new member states is waning
amongst both the EU political elite and the general public. In such a context, the capacity
of the EU to transfer its institutional norms on the basis of rewards and sanctions is
severely limited (Toneva-Metodieva 2014): all parties involved in accession talks doubt
each other’s commitment to comply with conditions and provide benefits. This implies
that the EU needs to come up with a new approach that can secure credible and sustain-
able reforms in the Western Balkan candidate states.
New elements of this approach can be discerned in the Commission’s enlargement pro-
gress reports: there is a focus on effective parliamentary oversight in candidate states,
greater attention to judicial reforms, control over acquis implementation (as opposed to
adoption), and transparent party funding. The Commission has recognised that “the
role of national parliaments remains underdeveloped” and parliamentary scrutiny in the
Balkans often remains a formality (European Commission 2013; European Commission
2014a). The new focus lies in empowering national parliaments and NGOs of the candidate
states to act as “watchdogs” in the conduct of accession-related reforms. Previously, the EU
has focused on strengthening the capacity of candidate states’ executives and largely neg-
lected respective parliamentary bodies. Although the Commission was aware that this
negatively affected the inclusiveness of the accession process, its main concern was
about timely adoption of the acquis communautaire (A5). Recently, as respondents from
the Commission (A3, A6) as well as studies commissioned by the European Parliament
(COWI 2014) testified, there is a greater focus on parliamentary administration, training
of MPs and parliamentary involvement in the accession process within the candidate
states’ progress reports. It is possible to discern several reasons behind the introduction
of this new approach.
The first reason is the limited impact of CVM on judicial reform effectiveness in Bulgaria
and Romania. Although CVM has contributed to some improvement in the judicial sphere
(Spendzharova and Vachudova 2012; Vachudova and Spendzharova 2012; Gateva 2013),
its overall impact has been disputed (Kavrakova 2009; O’Brennan 2014; İçener and Phinne-
more 2015). As a current staff member of the EEAS puts it, “CVM in Romania provided
some leverage but was imperfect… The EU had leverage before accession but it vanished
after the accession. CVM was one of the few instruments at the disposal of the EU” (A1). In
fact, the idea of introducing a similar CVM with Croatia has been disregarded precisely
because the Commission introduced a more rigorous process in terms of preparing for
the accession (A2). A staff member of the Commission presents an assessment of the
CVM’s usefulness for Western Balkan candidate states:
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Our objective, also in Croatia, was precisely to avoid the CVM. We wanted to make sure that
the countries are ready upon accession, through the new methodology, the introduction of
opening and closing benchmarks and the focus on the rule of law. (A3)
It is quite telling that a former MEP who specialises in Eastern Europe and Balkan affairs
described the possibility of re-introducing CVM for future candidate states in the following
terms:
No, never again. It did not work, it was a mistake…We should have taken more time to get
more guarantees on the implementation side from Bulgaria and Romania – they still have not
done what they promised; they do not care. Such problems should be solved before countries
join. (A4)
In other words, the CVM does not guarantee the fulﬁlment of reform commitments by the
candidate states and new mechanisms of sustaining the reform process are necessary.
Secondly, there is a need for greater credibility and openness of the enlargement
process itself. The Commission has been criticised for managing enlargement as an
elite-driven process: low involvement of civil society and parliaments from candidate
states undermines the positive effect of the EU’s democracy and rule of law assistance
(Chandler 2010; Balkans in Europe Advisory Policy Group/BiEPAG 2014). Many experts
argue that the Commission’s suggestions for conducting democratic reforms are arbitrary
and lack uniformity, while conditionality is not applied in a consistent manner (Kochenov
2004; Piana 2009; De Ridder and Kochenov 2011; Kmezic 2014).8 Conducting enlargement
negotiations in the same old manner exacerbates “enlargement fatigue” in the candidate
states, while the perceived lack of legitimacy by the candidate states leads to fake and
partial compliance with EU demands (Noutcheva 2009, 2012). In principle, the EU’s aim
of sustaining democratic states in the Western Balkans cannot be achieved without creat-
ing representative and power-sharing institutions as strong parliaments help consolidate
democracy (Fish 2006; Dolenec 2013; Elbasani 2013).
Thirdly, the Commission faces a specific dilemma of monitoring progress in the candi-
date states. Addressing politically sensitive issues is crucial to ensure sustainability of gov-
ernance and democratic reforms, especially in situations where governmental actors often
instrumentalise EU conditionality and assistance in order to consolidate their power rather
than advance reforms (Ganev 2013; Stratulat 2014). Yet precisely such involvement in pol-
itically sensitive issues triggers resentment from candidate states and accusations towards
the EU (Aspen Institute 2014). Both the Commission and EEAS, which is also involved in
managing aspects of EU-Balkan relations, are very eager to avoid such accusations (A1,
A7). In relation to the judicial sector, Nicolaidis and Kleinfeld (2012, 6) describe the situ-
ation in following terms: the EU needs to strike a balance between assessing and promot-
ing rule of law and the “imperative of exercising humility regarding the claims made by the
EU on the behalf of the rule of law assessment”.
This leaves the adoption of EU rules and norms subject to arbitrary reversal: candidate
states can fake compliance because EU demands are not considered as legitimate
(Noutcheva 2009). The authority of the Commission to monitor compliance in politically
sensitive domains can de facto be questioned by the candidate states. The problem can
be even more challenging when EU conditionality addresses policy areas which are not,
strictly speaking, part of the acquis (e.g. judicial reforms), potentially resulting in ambigu-
ous messages and incoherent policies on the part of the EU. This allows local elites to “use
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and abuse the EU integration card for their own purposes”; there remain doubts about the
sustainability of reforms even in successful cases (Keil and Arkan 2015b, 236–237).
Hence, the Commission tries to overcome the “executive bias” of the accession process
(Balfour and Stratulat 2013, 33) and increase its “ownership” by empowering local actors
and stakeholders to carry out monitoring of politically sensitive domains (party funding,
rule of law, etc.). A staff member of the Commission describes the new approach in the
following terms: “We want to be sure that there are internal monitoring mechanisms
[within candidate states] to sanction and detect problems as well as act accordingly”
(A5). The key stakeholders in this process are candidate states’ parliaments as they
provide a more institutionalised and less partisan platform for public deliberation and
debates in comparison to NGOs and civil society groups. Ultimately, even if such involve-
ment cannot on its own guarantee comprehensive implementation of EU rules, it never-
theless creates a set of institutional guarantees that could help secure the
accountability of the executive branch and diminish partial or fake compliance with EU
demands. What has been the mechanism behind the transformation of the Commission’s
management of Western Balkan accession? It can be argued that it has been the result of
social learning (Zito and Schout 2009) by the Commission as well as increased policy lever-
age of the European Parliament.9
First of all, a substantial number of Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlar-
gement Negotiations (DG NEAR) staff that is currently working on the Western Balkans
dossier has had experience with the fifth enlargement round.10 Reflection on individual
experience and learning could have been institutionalised at the higher levels of Commis-
sion hierarchy and contributed to the transformation of accession management. For
example, Bågenholm (2006) argues that the Commission was aware of the limited
support it was providing for candidate states’ parliaments and the challenges that such
an approach could bring. Members of the academic community have also raised critical
voices about the long-term effect of marginalising parliaments in the accession process
(Grabbe 2001). However, the issue has not been considered a crucial problem by Commis-
sion staff and would only catch attention after successive rounds of reflection over the
achievements and shortcomings of the fifth enlargement. In fact, Pridham (2007) argues
that in the aftermath of the East European enlargement round, the Commission has
indeed engaged in drawing lessons from accession management.
Secondly, respondents from the European Parliament (A10, A11) have argued that
greater attention to parliamentary institutions in the Western Balkans is the result of a sys-
tematic inter-institutional dialogue between the Commission and the European Parlia-
ment. This reflects growing willingness of the European Parliament to exert leverage in
foreign affairs after the Lisbon Treaty. In the fifth round of EU enlargement, the European
Parliament has already been involved in socialising MPs from candidate states. However,
there is a novel trend. For example, legislatures of Western Balkan candidate states are
now connected to the information exchange system between the European Parliament
and parliaments of EU member states. Moreover, the Commission and European Parlia-
ment have recently joint forces in mediating conflicts between the parliamentary majority
and opposition in several Western Balkan candidate states.
The transformation of the European Commission’s approach does not imply that the EU
has abandoned its policy of rewards and sanctions towards candidate states. The EU
enlargement toolkit still includes both conditionality and socialisation instruments
EAST EUROPEAN POLITICS 509
(Sedelmeier 2011); for adequate understanding of the accession talks, one needs to make
use of both rationalist and constructivist explanations (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
2005; O’Brennan 2006). Rather, the Commission explores new modes of securing compli-
ance that are based on enhancing the legitimacy of EU demands and “ownership” by can-
didate states. Such a shift is taking place because the key components of conditionality-
based strategy are faltering: the timing and the credibility of the reward (membership)
remains vague, while the monitoring capacity of the Commission increasingly comes
against criticism from candidate states due to its alleged bias. On the other hand, discuss-
ing and debating the rules increases compliance better than the exclusive application of
conditionality as the cost of adaptation is shared by all parties involved (Checkel 2000;
Börzel and Risse 2012). This theoretical claim is in line with the findings of Noutcheva
(2012). She argues that rather than predominantly rationality-based accounts of the fifth
enlargement (Vachudova 2005), in the framework of Western Balkan accession it is the
focus on normative context and legitimacy of EU demands that provides more explanatory
power.
Consequences of the commission policy shift for candidate states’
parliaments
Literature argues that in the course of the fifth enlargement round, parliaments in Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE) have acquired institutional means to address EU affairs (Syllová
and Kolař 2004). Although parliaments played a crucial role in democratic consolidation,
their policy input during the accession process has been limited (Haughton 2007;
Kopecký 2007).11 The EU was concerned with quick adoption of the acquis communautaire
in order to diminish the potential influence of “veto players”. The fears of the EU have been
unfounded. Research dealing on both CEE candidate states (Bågenholm 2005) as well as
“old member states” (Dörenbächer, Mastenbroek, and Toshkov 2015; Finke and Dannwolf
2015) has shown that parliamentary involvement does not negatively affect acquis trans-
position. Nevertheless, earlier research on Balkan accession argues that EU focused on
securing legislative output of the candidate states’ parliaments at the expense of their
ability to scrutinise domestic executives (Balfour and Stratulat 2011; Teokarevic 2011; Ris-
teska 2013).
The change of the EU approach towards managing enlargement provides candidate
states’ parliaments with more opportunities to shape the accession process as their in-
depth involvement is now considered more acceptable by the Commission. Building on
their experience in domestic (as opposed to EU-driven) judicial reforms, candidate
states’ parliaments can exert greater leverage (Magalhães 1999). Practitioners see
greater activism of national parliaments in accession talks as well as forecast growing
inter-party differences within candidate states as enlargement progresses (A8). Others
argue that “increasingly you see that parliaments are reluctant to blindly rubber-stamp
and continue and accept whatever there is. For Croatia this still worked, in Montenegro
it is already a bit problematic in some areas, in Macedonia it is very problematic” (A7).
However, a staff member of the Commission stresses that “the fact that parliament is
involved is of course in principle a good thing but it does not say anything about the
outcome, is the law better or worse” (A3). One example is the case of the Serbian Law
on the Seats and Territorial Jurisdiction of Courts and Public Prosecutor’s Office: there
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was widespread public resistance because no parliamentary debate has taken place (Men-
delski 2013a, 110–111). A staff member of the Commission elaborates on another example
from Montenegro:
We have seen an example of the law on conflict of interests, an important law on corruption
adopted in the end of last year. Initially the law was meant to cover all public officials, includ-
ing the MPs. One of the contributions of the parliament was to take out the MPs from the law
on conflict of interests. It makes you wonder. This is one of the examples I had in mind that
involvement of the parliament does not always improve a specific law. (A3)
The response of candidate states’ parliaments to the change in the Commission approach
can be seen as being guided by cost–beneﬁt calculations. Candidate states’ parliaments
want to be involved in shaping the accession process in order to address both policy
and electoral goals. They will not simply try to block or uphold EU demands but shape
the proposed policy solutions. Drawing on the literature dealing with the CEE accession
process (Grabbe 2006; Jacoby 2006; Sedelmeier 2011), it is possible to formulate a
number of expectations about factors that are conducive to involvement of candidate
states’ parliaments. Such involvement is most likely when:
(1) The EU acquis is not extensive or not uniform. Grabbe (2006) uses the terms “diffuseness
of influence” and “uncertainty”, stipulating that when EU lacks clear institutional tem-
plates to transfer and there is uncertainty about what counts as meeting criteria, dom-
estic actors have greater leverage on the accession process;
(2) Salience of a policy issue is high. According to Grabbe (2006), the higher the contesta-
tion over the outcome of reforms in a given policy sector, the more salient it is. Con-
testation can relate to high adjustment costs, presence of “veto players”, existence of
alternative policy frames (Sedelmeier 2011);
(3) Legitimacy of direct EU involvement is contested. Jacoby (2006, 630) uses the term “sub-
stitution”, a situation when “external actors attempt to promote and execute specific
reforms on their own”, with limited involvement of domestic actors. However, direct
imposition of EU demands is perceived differently depending on the policy sector:
in relation to reform of key political and judicial institutions such demands can be con-
sidered as unwarranted infringement of sovereignty.
All of these expectations are met in the domain of the rule of law. Firstly, the EU has
elaborated on the content of rule of law reforms in great detail in the Western Balkans
and introduced extensive benchmarking to keep track of the process (Nozar 2012).
However, reforms of the judiciary in the Western Balkans encouraged by the EU are not
based on a template that is shared by all EU member states. Moreover, the consistency
of EU rule of law promotion policies in the region has been criticised (Mungiu-Pippidi
2011; Fatić 2012). For example, the EU is very much focused on the creation of so-called
judicial councils,12 disregarding other policy options. The push towards introducing auton-
omous judicial councils without concomitant checks and balances can result in uncon-
trolled judicial supremacy (Parau 2012; Coman 2014; Fagan and Sircar 2015). In general,
the trend towards rule of law promotion with almost exclusive focus on the judiciary (as
opposed to other political actors) is increasingly criticised (Carothers 2003; Preshova 2014).
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Secondly, rule of law reforms are extremely salient, as compliance with Chapters 23 and
24 of the acquis is considered to be the main challenge for successful membership of
Western Balkan candidate states (Memeti 2014). However, Western Balkan ruling elites
from different ideological backgrounds have contested EU demands in the rule of law
domain (Noutcheva 2009; Noutcheva and Aydin-Düzgit 2012; Mendelski 2013b). In fact,
in the context of the Balkan rule of law reform, the key challenge is not the formal adop-
tion of legal measures but the way they are implemented (Aspen Institute 2014).
Thirdly, as Noutcheva (2012) points out, EU conditionality is most contested on issues of
sovereignty and identity. For example, cooperation between Western Balkan states and
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), a significant aspect
of rule of law reform, has been shaped by national identities and perceptions (Schimmel-
fennig 2008; Freyburg and Richter 2010).
The claim about activism of Western Balkan candidate state parliaments in the judicial
accession-related reforms contradicts the analysis of Parau (2013). Parau argues that
during the accession process of the CEE countries, their parliaments did not resist the
imposed templates of judicial reform and did not act as ex ante veto players. Without
doubting the relevancy of this analysis for the CEE region, there are reasons to consider
why this is different in the context of Balkan enlargement. First, in the context of the “enlar-
gement fatigue”, domestic institutions of candidate states can have more incentives to
resist EU demands as the reward for compliance is unclear. Secondly, the EU has not com-
prehensively developed the Chapters 23 and 24 of the acquis dealing with the “rule of law”
at the time of CEE enlargement. Now these policy issues are much more prominent in the
negotiations and ignoring them could be costly for Western Balkan MPs. Thirdly, Western
Balkan parliaments can resist and shape EU-imposed judicial reforms ex-post, for example,
through passing by-laws and technical regulation. Macedonia provides an interesting
example of such practice. Although only graduates of the so-called Judicial Academy
can be nominated to the posts of judges and prosecutors in Macedonia, the parliament
passed a law that effectively allowed circumventing this obligation. A staff member of
the Commission (A6) describes the situation in following terms:
For three years in a row they do not recruit anyone from the Academy and there is a weird
transitional provision which is interpreted by the Judicial Council. After digging and
digging you have suspicions that someone has just picked up the phone and called the pre-
sident of the Judicial Council, telling whom to appoint. This has happened 3–4 years ago. We
had no proof. Every time we met with the Judicial Council, which is in charge of the Judicial
Academy, we say that they are bound by the law, they must recruit from the Academy and not
from somewhere else. And for three years in a row we get a response that the Judicial Council
is an independent body that votes democratically. (A6)
The Judicial Council was able to do so only because the Macedonian parliament provided
it with the necessary legal framework. This example does not mean that Western Balkan
parliaments will undermine EU inﬂuence in each and every case. Rather it illustrates
that they have the ability to shape the content of accession-related reforms.
In general, increased parliamentary involvement in the reform of Western Balkan rule of
law sector can have important implications. The promotion of judicial reforms by the EU
through the “external incentive model” has not substantially improved the rule of law situ-
ation in the Balkans (Guarnieri 2013; Mendelski 2013b). On the other hand, involvement of
candidate states’ parliaments can enhance “ownership” and effectiveness of accession-
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related judicial reforms (Berenschot, Imagos 2013; CEDEM 2014; Dallara 2014; Fouéré 2014;
Misev 2014). This is an important condition for democratic consolidation in the region (Car-
others 1998; Diamond and Morlino 2004; Vachudova 2014).
Factors affecting involvement of candidate states’ parliaments in the
accession process
The previous section has considered under what conditions parliamentary involvement
in the accession process is likely to take place. It should be noted, however, that parlia-
ments from different candidate states will not necessarily respond to the shift in the
Commission’s enlargement policy in a similar way. In order to consider the factors
that account for such variation, we draw on literature dealing with Europeanisation
of national parliaments and democratic transition in CEE (Grzymała-Busse 2005, 2007,
2010; Frye 2010).13
Raunio (2014) argues that parliaments of current EU member states adapted to Euro-
pean integration through institutional engineering, for example, by enhancing the
powers of European Affairs Committees, and through sharing “best practices” with
other legislatures. Variation among scrutiny systems has been explained by institutional
factors (committee strength, formal parliamentary powers, etc.) as well as levels of Euro-
scepticism, although recent research has questioned the validity of the latter parameter
(Raunio 2014; Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015). Researchers point to a substantial gap
between formal rules and parliamentary behaviour in a large number of legislatures
(Auel, Rozenberg, and Tacea 2015a). The mismatch between formal rules and political
practice in Western Balkan parliaments can be illustrated by the following example. At
the end of 2013, both Serbian and Montenegrin parliaments adopted official declarations
stating that they aim to be actively involved in the accession talks (European Commission
2014b; European Commission 2014c). Although interviewees have not been able to
provide a detailed assessment of the implementation of such official declarations, some
respondents (A4, A11) pointed out the risk of these formal commitments not being fol-
lowed up by changes in parliamentary behaviour. Another respondent (A12) acknowl-
edged that since 2014, the Serbian parliament publishes a contribution to the
Commission progress report, yet the policy impact of this action merits further
investigation.
Given the fact that formal institutional capacities do not determine how national parlia-
ments engage in EU affairs, a number of additional factors have been identified in the lit-
erature. The first such factor is administrative capacity. Christiansen, Högenauer, and
Neuhold (2014) examine bureaucratisation of parliamentary scrutiny, because of the
growing role of parliamentary administrative actors in processing and handling infor-
mation on EU affairs. Ultimately, candidate states’ parliaments must have the administra-
tive capacity to acquire and process information in order to influence the accession
process and control respective governments. Moreover, Högenauer and Neuhold (2015)
have shown that the role of parliamentary administrators goes beyond technical
support as they can shape the scrutiny process.
Western Balkan candidate states face several challenges related to parliamentary
administrative capacity. One of the respondents describes administrative capacity of
Western Balkan parliaments in the following terms:
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I would say in general the administrative capacity is not good… The problem was not that the
parliamentary staff was bad, they were competent bureaucrats, I would say, but the mentality
was not good. All parliaments in the region are good in producing a lot of paperwork, when-
ever there is a problem they will propose to draft some regulation. (A7)
Another respondent (A9) mentions that more resources have to be invested into the train-
ing programmes for Western Balkan MPs as well as parliamentary and party staff. The
ongoing Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) programme for enhancing the
administrative capacity of Balkan parliaments provides only a partial solution to the chal-
lenge. According to a staff member of the European Parliament (A11), many of those who
beneﬁt from the training schemes later leave for business or government sectors as they
provide higher salaries.14 Such EU programmes can only be effective if they are comple-
mented by the “home-grown” strategies of Western Balkan parliaments to retain high-
quality staff. An important point of concern is the capacity of Western Balkan parliaments
to obtain adequate information on the progress of accession talks as well as analyse it. For
example, a staff member of the Commission (A5) says that the Serbian European inte-
gration Ofﬁce (SEIO) shares information with the relevant committees and working
groups in the parliament. The question remains whether this information feeds into the
policy cycle and is actively used by the Serbian National Assembly. Another example of
administrative challenges facing Western Balkan parliaments is the decision of the Monte-
negrin government to regard accession negotiation positions as conﬁdential, a measure
that could severely limit the capacity of the Montenegrin parliament to inﬂuence and
control the accession process (Klaas 2014).
The second factor that shapes the way legislatures address EU affairs is involvement in
inter-parliamentary cooperation. Parliaments develop linkages with legislatures from other
EU member states in order to address policy concerns, establish information networks, and
share “best practices” (Crum and Fossum 2013; Christiansen, Högenauer, and Neuhold
2014; Hefftler and Gattermann 2015). Such cooperation can be pursued at both formal
and informal fora, enhancing the abilities of parliaments to influence the policy process.
In fact, parliaments of candidate states are already widely engaged in inter-parliamen-
tary cooperation (COWI 2014). Joint Parliamentary Committees (JPCs) between Western
Balkan candidate states and the European Parliament are one of the important venues
for inter-parliamentary cooperation (Ozcurumez and Hoxha 2015). JPCs help socialise
MPs from Western Balkan countries, transfer “best practices” (also in terms of distinct
policy templates), and develop European political parties (A11, A12). In principle, JPCs
can also serve as a tool for mediation in internal Western Balkan political conflicts. A
staff member of the Commission (A3) describes the role of the Stabilisation and Associ-
ation Parliamentary Committee within the context of the Montenegrin accession:
The committee does not intervene directly in the negotiations but it plays an important role in
the political dialogue in Montenegro between political parties, which has often not been easy.
For example, a year or two ago there was a partial boycott of the parliament, the opposition
walked out. This is an area where the Commission is not very well placed to intervene.
Through the Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, its chairman and the
European Commission, there has been a coordinated push to have this dialogue again. This
is not intervening directly in the negotiations but the negotiations cannot go ahead if the par-
liament is not working or the opposition is not in the parliament.
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It is noteworthy that, during JPC meetings, issues of the rule of law and anti-corruption
appear in a rather ad hoc manner: rule of law is stressed in general but specific problems
rarely appear on the agenda. However, even when specific rule-of-law problems are dis-
cussed, the EU’s leverage can be limited: judicial provisions that raise concerns within
the EU can simply be moved to less-well-known pieces of candidate states’ legislation
and continue to be applied (A11).
The third factor that influences parliamentary behaviour in EU affairs is the pattern of
inter-party competition. Auel, Rozenberg, and Tacea (2015b) argue that the different
logic of political competition in majoritarian and consensus political systems affects parlia-
mentary behaviour in EU affairs: the higher propensity of consensus-orientated systems to
coalition governments is conducive to parliamentary activism. Strelkov (2015) corrobo-
rates these findings, showing that consensual interaction (as opposed to majoritarian)
between parliamentary party groups allows for a more systematic involvement of the
opposition and more in-depth, policy-oriented assessment of EU proposals. The argument
about the crucial role of inter-party competition is also supported by literature on demo-
cratic transition in CEE. For example, Frye (2010) argues that reforms are more challenging
in regimes with strong “majoritarian characteristics”. There is less pressure to overcome
polarisation, and as the policy distance between parties grows, so does the chance that
reforms will be side-tracked. Grzymała-Busse (2005) similarly stresses that the robustness
of inter-party competition is crucial for democratic consolidation. This implies that compe-
tition has to be inclusive (no political party should be excluded from the political arena a
priori), while “opposition parties have to offer clear, plausible and critical governing
alternative that threatens the governing coalition with replacement”.
There are several examples of how inter-party competition has affected parliamentary
involvement in the accession process. For instance, the lack of a constructive framework
for inter-party cooperation results in perpetual boycotts of parliamentary institutions by
the opposition in Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania (A10). In February 2013, the Mon-
tenegrin opposition requested to convene extraordinary sessions of the parliament, yet
because there was no majority for the adoption of the agenda the sessions were closed
(Klaas 2014, 47). In principle, according to a practitioner (A11), minority governments in
Western Balkan candidate states provide more room for parliamentary involvement, as
is the case in Montenegro; the dominance of the governing majority very often makes
such involvement problematic. The ability to constructively address inter-party relations
will determine whether Western Balkan parliaments can secure effective oversight of
respective governmental policies. Inter-party competition also affects the way Western
Balkan legislatures develop their contacts with the European Parliament. For example,
the quality of discussions during JPC meetings is affected by the partisan composition
of Western Balkan delegations: when the opposition MPs are heavily outnumbered,
debates tend to become biased and unproductive. A staff member of the European Parlia-
ment elaborates on this, saying that “if one force is dominating, then there is not much
room for us; we can try but it is not efficient. If the gap is smaller than we can make a differ-
ence” (A11).
In the Western Balkan context, inter-party competition is often framed by clientelism:15
the focus is not on policy-seeking but instead on rent-seeking. Several interviewees (A7,
A12) stress that the ability of parliaments to act as transparent bodies of oversight, and
EAST EUROPEAN POLITICS 515
accountability can be seriously curtailed by such practices. An interviewee (A7) summar-
ises his views by saying:
The core of the business is not parliament, it has to do with political party groups, the support
you get from political party… If MPs, the political level, are not supportive, it is not going to
work. That is the baseline.
As another interviewee aptly puts, amongst Western Balkan candidate states, the parlia-
ments are generally “top-down”, which means that “they are there either to support the
government or shout at the government under strict control of their leaders. These are
not independent parliaments. This limits scrutiny and the impact of parliaments on the
process” (A4). Ultimately, in the Western Balkan context, the analytical challenge is not
only to take into account the discrepancy between formal parliamentary competences
and the actual behaviour. Rather, the challenge is more structural: one needs to grasp
how formal institutions interact with the informal ones within the political systems of
Western Balkan candidate states (Marcic 2015).16 Informal institutions shape elite and
inter-party competition, yet in order for it to be robust, inter-party competition has to
be focused on formal institutional venues, for example, parliaments (Grzymała-Busse
2007, 2010). The subversion of formal institutions by informal practices has to be
brought to a minimum in order to secure compliance and progress of accession-related
reforms (Börzel 2011; Vachudova 2015).
Conclusion
Although Balkan enlargement is still on the agenda of the EU, the exact timing of this
process remains unknown. The onset of “enlargement fatigue” undermines the credibility
of the accession model: the connection between compliance with EU conditions and the
granting of membership status is not taken for granted. At the same time, the ability of the
Balkan candidate states to enhance the quality of the rule of law as well as successfully
transfer and apply Chapters 23 and 24 of the acquis is crucial for their EU membership
application. The Commission’s approach towards enlargement management has
evolved in order to address the above-mentioned challenge. As the CVM has not been
able to secure compliance with reform commitments in the rule of law sector, the Com-
mission realised that it has to go beyond the “external incentives” approach to guarantee
compliance with accession criteria. In the process of social learning from the fifth round of
enlargement as well due to a more intense dialogue with the EP, the Commission has
started to pay greater attention to the parliaments of Western Balkan candidate states.
The logic of this policy shift is to enhance “ownership” of accession-related reforms and
empower domestic actors that can act as legitimate “watchdogs”.
Such measures will not necessarily directly enhance rule of law and democracy in the
Western Balkans but will imply that parliaments of candidate states are likely to play a
greater role in the accession process. Drawing on the literature on CEE accession, it has
been suggested that such parliamentary activism is more likely if: (1) EU acquis is not
extensive (or not uniform); (2) salience of a given policy issue is high; and (3) legitimacy
of EU direct involvement is questioned. In the rule of law domain, all of these factors
are met. Firstly, the EU is trying to promote a template of judicial organisation that is
not universally applied amongst its own member states. Secondly, the content of the
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Western Balkan rule of law reforms is extremely salient: political actors of different ideo-
logical backgrounds have tried to influence the content of the judicial reforms, irrespective
of their attitude towards EU membership. Moreover, the involvement of the EU in some
aspects of the Western Balkan judicial reform is heavily contested.
Parliaments from various Western Balkan candidate states are likely to behave differ-
ently in the context of the Commission policy shift. On the basis of literature on Europea-
nisation of national parliaments and democratic transition in the CEE region, a number of
factors that could explain parliamentary involvement can be discerned. It should be noted
that further fieldwork in the Balkans17 is necessary to test the explanatory power of these
factors and gather information on parliamentary involvement in judicial reforms. Admin-
istrative capacity of candidate states’ parliaments, involvement in inter-parliamentary
cooperation, and patterns of inter-party competition could mediate parliamentary involve-
ment. For Western Balkan parliaments, the key challenge in terms of administrative
capacity is timely access to government documents as well as the ability to process EU-
related information. Inter-parliamentary cooperation (especially relations with the Euro-
pean Parliament) could play an important role in socialising Western Balkan MPs and
sharing “best practices”. Inter-party competition in consensually orientated political
systems is more conducive to effective parliamentary oversight of government policies.
In practice, elite and inter-party competition in the Balkans often falls short of the “inclu-
siveness ideal”. Informal rules and practices often subvert the activities of parliamentary
institutions in the Balkans. Nonetheless, involvement of national parliaments can help
overturn the “executive bias” and secure inclusiveness of the accession process. As acces-
sion negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro have started only recently,18 it is difficult at
the moment to provide a comprehensive assessment of Western Balkan parliaments’ input
into the accession process. This topic, however, should be addressed in subsequent
empirical research.
Notes
1. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo are
considered as parts of Western Balkans. The term “Balkan enlargement” refers to the (poten-
tial) accession of these countries to the EU.
2. Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification for Bulgaria and Romania (CVM) – an instrument
set up by the Commission to monitor Bulgarian and Romanian progress on judicial reform,
fighting corruption and organised crime after both countries became EU members. CVM
was launched at the end of 2006 and is still ongoing.
3. The chapters of the acquis do not aim to define the “rule of law” concept. It acknowledges that
there is a plethora of procedural and substantive definitions. See Jensen (2003) and Magen
(2009) on the debate about the possible definitions of the “rule of law”.
4. The article does not claim that such parliamentary involvement will directly enhance the state
of democracy and rule of law in the Western Balkans – further research is needed to substanti-
ate such a claim. It is argued, however, that parliaments of candidate states have to be con-
sidered when analysing the conduct of the accession process.
5. It is acknowledged that parliamentary involvement can vary depending on the policy sector at
stake. Nevertheless, only the judicial sector is considered due to its crucial importance for
Balkan accession.
6. Including Macedonia may be considered premature as negotiations remain blocked. However,
it has enjoyed candidate status for a decade. Also the Commission has not recommended
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opening accession talks with other Balkan countries such as Albania or Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
7. The article does not make any attempt to aggregate the various indices. In general, the rank-
ings of Macedonia (FYROM) are worse than those for Montenegro or Serbia.
8. There is, however, an alternative opinion that the EU’s policy of promoting the rule of law
should not strive for uniformity and should be differentiated (see Burlyuk 2015). For a more
positive assessment of the EU rule of law promotion policies, see Pech (2012, 2013).
9. The nature of the causal mechanism involved in the shift of the Commission merits further
investigation.
10. The article does not aim to provide exhaustive data on the career paths of current DG NEAR
staff members. However, all of the Commission staff that have been interviewed occupy senior
positions and have had experience with the enlargement rounds of 2004, 2007, and 2013.
11. Andrews (2014, 663) argues that the “apparent docility of parliaments” was the result of con-
sensus on EU accession; however, this contributed to a situation where institutional strength
of CEE parliaments is not reflected in their limited political activism.
12. Self-governing bodies that cover nomination, promotion, and disciplinary sanctions within the
judiciary.
13. This is possible since both CEE and Western Balkan states faced the challenge of “multiple
transition” (Offe 2004).
14. The training programmes run by the European Parliament may be less likely to face this chal-
lenge as they focus primarily on clerks with at least several years of parliamentary experience
and members of parliaments (A12).
15. See Hicken (2011) on the various definitions and approaches to clientelism. See Trantidis
(2015) on the negative effect of clientelism on democracy.
16. On the different modes of interaction between formal and informal institutions, see Helmke
and Levitsky (2004), Grzymała-Busse (2010).
17. Ideally not only in Western Balkan candidate countries but also in potential accession states.
18. Accession negotiations with Montenegro started in late June 2012, and in early 2014 with
Serbia.
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